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THE USE OF SUPPORT MODIFICATION TO
RE-LITIGATE EQUITABLY DIVIDED PROPERTY IN
MASSACHUSETTS: DOES HEINS V LEDIS' DRAW
THE LINE?
I. INTRODUCTION

Massachusetts probate courts restructure a divorcing couple's finances in
two distinct ways, equitable distribution of marital assets and traditional
alimony.2 In most jurisdictions, including Massachusetts, alimony is an ongoing
obligation subject to modification, while equitable distribution, a legal judgment,
cannot be re-litigated once the divorce is final. Notwithstanding their separate
legal underpinnings, attempts to coordinate alimony and equitable distribution
awards have blurred the distinctions between them 4 The concept of the fmal and
enduring equitable distribution is now largely illusory, subordinated to alimony
and child support considerations.' Consequently, when assets taken through an

' 422 Mass. 477, 664 N.E.2d 10 (1996).
2 See Putnam v. Putnam, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 10, 15, 358 N.E.2d 837, 839-40 (1977)
(containing an explanation of alimony and property division); see Monroe Inker, Joseph
Walsh and Paul Perocchi, Alimony andAssignment ofProperty:The New Statutory Scheme
in Massachusetts,10 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1, 10-13 (1975) (hereinafter Inker) (discussing
the primary cases that interpret Massachusetts General Laws chapter 208, § 34 (1975)).
' See Kirtz v. Kirtz, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 141, 144, 421 N.E.2d 1270, 1272 (1981)
(denying reconsideration of property division following allegations that husband
understated asset values); Maze v. Mihalovich, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 323, 325, 387 N.E.2d 196,
198 (1979) (holding property division could be awarded where not previously adjudicated).
4 See Dewan v. Dewan, 399 Mass. 754, 759, 506 N.E.2d 879, 882 (1987) (noting

that "symmetry was broken" where trial court altered award on remand); Hamblett v. Lewis,
114 N.H. 258, 260, 319 A.2d 629, 631 (1974) (noting that property division and alimony
are necessarily interrelated); Monroe Inker, Charles Kindregan, Ann Wagner & Marcia
Boumil, Alimony and Assignment of Property: A Survey of the Last Decade of
Massachusetts Law, 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 21, 39-48 (1992) (hereinafter Inker &
Kindregan) (surveying cases interpreting Massachusetts General Laws chapter 208, § 34
(1974)); cf. Jana Singer, Divorce Obligations& Bankruptcy Discharge:Rethinking the
Support/PropertyDistinction,30 HARvARD J. ON LEGIS. 43, 45 (1993) (attributing change
in nature of awards to consideration of formerly excluded intangible property).
' See, e.g., Schuler v. Schuler, 382 Mass. 366, 369, 416 N.E.2d 197, 201 (1981)
(including proceeds from previously divided .property in alimony analysis); Krokyn v.
Krokyn, 378 Mass. 206, 213, 390 N.E.2d 733, 737 (1979) (recasting occupancy and sale
provision as child support); Hartog v. Hartog, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 124, 128, 535 N.E.2d 239,
241 (1989) (including newly created property interest in alimony analysis).
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equitable division are lost or diminished, there is no barrier in either current law
or judicial precedent that prevents recipient spouses from re-litigating through
alimony or child support avenues.6 Presently, probate court judges have
near-absolute discretion to redistribute property through alimony and child
support modification orders (support orders).7 This "back-door" to re-litigating
property divisions should gain popularity where assets from an equitable
division lose their value due to unforeseen circumstances or negligent
dissipation.'
This article proposes a halt in the erosion of reliable and final equitable
distribution. The Supreme Judicial Court should adhere to the legal principles
espoused in its lead cases and used in other jurisdictions, to prevent the de-facto
relitigation endemic in Massachusetts.9 Recently, in Heins v. Ledis,'0 the
Supreme Judicial Court had an opportunity to clarify its position on inequitable
valuations, but the Court specifically refused to address the issue. Instead, the
court narrowly held that initial alimony cannot be used as a vehicle to reimburse

' See Belsky v. Belsky, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 852, 853, 400 N.E.2d 878, 880 (1980)
(holding there should be a reconsideration of alimony should equitably-divided pension
become diminished); Inker, supra note 2, at 21-22 (summarizing the impact of equitable
distribution upon alimony modification); cf.Schuler, 382 Mass. at 369, 416 N.E.2d at 201
(upholding modifications due in part to the "substantial assets" awarded to husband in
divorce decree).
7 See Dominick v. Dominick, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 85, 89-90, 463 N.E.2d 564, 568
(1984) (holding court not required to re-open proceedings on evidentiary issues); Robbins
v. Robbins, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 576, 578, 453 N.E.2d 1058, 1060 (1983) (holding that "an

exercise ofjudgment . . . will be entitled to considerable respect").

8 See Inker, supra note 2, at 21-22 (discussing the "indirect affects" that
Massachusetts General Laws chapter 208, § 34 (1975) will have on valuation analysis).
' See, e.g., Hay v. Cloutier, 389 Mass. 248, 252, 449 N.E.2d 361, 363 (1983)
(holding issues raised in divorce litigation were res judicata); Kirtz v. Kirtz, 12 Mass. App.
Ct. 141,144,421 N.E.2d 1270, 1272 (1981) (denying reconsideration of property division
following allegations that husband understated asset values); Maze v. Mihalovich, 7 Mass.
App. Ct. 323, 325, 387 N.E.2d 196, 198 (1979) (holding property division proper where
not previously adjudicated); accondOlski v. Olski, 197 Wis. 2d 237, 250, 540 N.W.2d 412,
417 (1995) (excluding assets from modification where that asset was equitably divided at
the divorce proceeding). The O/s)d decision rejected the premise that a pension was a single
asset, instead holding that a pension was a pool of funds that could be segregated into
marital and post-marital earnings. Olski, 197 Wis.2d at 250, 540 N.W.2d at 417; see also
Thiese v. Thiese, 164 Vt. 577, 579, 674 A.2d 789, 790-91 (1996) (striking down order
requiring obligor to name ex-wife as beneficiary of life insurance policy to provide
post-mortem maintenance). In Thiese, the policy had been previously awarded to the
husband in the property settlement at the time of divorce. Thiese, 164 Vt. at 579, 674 A.2d
at 791.
'0 422 Mass. 477, 478, 664 N.E.2d 10, 12 (1996).
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a spouse for marital contributions. Consequently, the Supreme Judicial Court
has sent a subtle message to probate practitioners that perpetuates the
"double-counting" of assets in Massachusetts by preserving form over
function."

II. DEVELOPMENT OF EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION IN MASSACHUSETrS
Prior to the passage of the equitable distribution statute, 2 assets owned in
the name of one spouse were not subject to any form of division because each
party kept assets in their own name, thus removing them from the marriage
"pot" of divisible property. 3 Traditional alimony derived from the husband's
duty to support his wife, and the amount of an award depended on the wife's
future needs and the husband's ability to pay.' 4 Alimony and child support were
statutory devices intended to deal with the economic disparities created by the

title system, however, their concurrent use as vehicles for continuing marital
warfare made them inefficient remedies. 5 In response, the legislature developed

equitable distribution, a concept based on the community property model. 6
Nearly every state now employs an equitable distribution form of property

division

7

This form of distribution has largely replaced alimony, either in part

or altogether, depending on the jurisdiction and the facts of each case.' 8

"
12

Id. at 485, 664 N.E.2d at 17.
MASS. GEN. L. CH. 208, § 34 (1975).

'3Heins v. Ledis, 422 Mass. 477, 486-87, 664 N.E.2d 10, 16 (1996); see Patricia A.
Cullen, Does Anybody Know the Rules in FederalDivorce Court?: A Casefor Revision

of the Bankruptcy Code, 46 RUTGERS L. REv. 427, 434-36 (1993) (advocating
nondischargeability of property division in bankruptcy). Irrespective of title, courts did
often oversee transfers of property in lieu of alimony. Inker, supra note 2, at 12. Often, this
is due to the illiquid nature of the couple's investments, usually a marital home, that is
transferred in order to satisfy the judgment. Inker, supra note 2, at 12.
'

See OBrien v. O'Brien, 325 Mass. 523, 577, 91 N.E.2d 775, 777 (1950)

(determining wife's financial need a factor in awarding alimony); Inker, supra note 2, at 12
(discussing the Massachusetts common-law title system of alimony). But see Orr v. Orr,
444 U.S. 1060, 1065, 100 S. Ct. 993, 997 (1980) (requiring alimony laws to be
gender-neutral in order to withstand constitutional challenge).
" See Inker, supra note 2, at 8-11 (discussing shortcomings of traditional alimony).
"6 See Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 122-23, 437 A.2d 883, 887-89 (1981)

(discussing the relation of community property and property division).
" See Cullen, supra note 13, at 437-38 (noting majority of states use equitable
distribution to directly divest titleholder).
" See Cullen, supra note 13, at 437-38. In Massachusetts, the courts hear property
division matters and will make orders dividing the property prior to making any orders for
alimony. See Inker, supra note 2, at 11. (discussing the need to make the division first in
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Equitable distribution, also called "property division," focuses on the past

contributions made by the parties during marriage to determine each party's
rights and obligations.' 9 Equitable distribution is also used to enlarge those
rights and obligations by expanding the definition of contribution to include
non-monetary contributions, such as homemaking and child care." To make
equitable distribution work, courts have intruded upon common law property
principles by rewarding the less affluent spouse with a greater share of the joint
marital assets and creating a debt to be satisfied by the newly indebted spouse.2"
Massachusetts courts have done away with the last vestiges of the title system
and will order assets conveyed directly to the recipient spouse.' This equitable
intrusion on a legal property concept was justified by comparing marriage to a
partnership and divorce to a dissolution of that partnership with each partner
entitled to a share irrespective of the nature of their contribution.23
Property division is also used to eliminate future dealings between parties.24
The rationale assumes that friction is lessened or eliminated when a division of
marital assets makes the dependent spouse self-sufficient.2 5 As a judgment
bearing on legal rights, a division fixes these rights and obligations, thus no

order to assess post-marital finances).
" Putnam v. Putnam, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 673, 675, 389 N.E.2d 777, 779 (1979)
(hereinafter PutnamI); see Inker, supra note 2, at 22 (discussing the use of guidelines in
property division). Recently, the Appeals Court extended the definition of "contribution"
to include premarital accumulation by cohabitants. Moriarty v. Stone, 41 Mass. App. Ct.
151, 157-58, 668 N.E.2d 1338, 1344 (1996).
" See hiker,supra note 2, at 11 (outlining the various "noneconomic" contributions
made by spouses to the marital estate).
2 Inker, supra note 2, at 11; cf Dumont v.-Godbey, 382 Mass. 234, 237, 415 N.E.2d
188, 190 (1981) (holding that spouse becomes a creditor for purposes of judgment).
' See Rice v. Rice, 372 Mass. 398, 400, 361 N.E.2d 1305, 1307 (1977) (upholding
Massachusetts General Laws chapter 208, § 34 in favor of equitable considerations over
traditional property notions); see Inker, supra note 2, at 6-7 (discussing the new equity
powers to transfer title).
" See, e.g., Bianco v. Bianco, 371 Mass. 420, 422, 358 N.E.2d 243, 244 (1976);
Davidson v. Davidson, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 364, 474 N.E.2d 1137, 1142-43 (1985); Rolde
v. Rolde, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 398, 402,425 N.E.2d 388, 390 (1981); see also hiker, supra,
note 2, at 3 n.8 (comparing the marital institution to a partnership for contribution
purposes).
2 Rolde, 12 Mass. App. Ct. at 402, 425 N.E.2d at 390; see Inker, supra note 2, at 10
(discussing beneficial effects of property division).
2 Inker, supra note 2, at 10. Massachusetts General Laws chapter 208, § 34 (1975),
states in pertinent part that property may be equitably distributed "in addition to or in lieu
of alimony." (emphasis added).
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further court intervention is allowed once a judgment is satisfied.26
Consequently, a division of marital assets is final and can only be set aside by
a showing of judicial error or by fraud on the part of the non-moving party.2"
When contemplating property division and support awards, however, the probate
court has nearly absolute discretion in how it will fashion an award.2 The

statute does, however, require a consideration of specific factors that must be
reviewed by the trial judge and appear in the judge's opinion.2 9 The standard of
review on appeal is "clear abuse of discretion" or a "plain error of fact or law."30
Support orders are usually awarded in addition to any division of marital
assets.3 Like property division, alimony and child support orders may also be

' See cases cited, supra note 3 (stating proposition that equitable distributions cannot
be relitigated).
27 See Hager v. Hager, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 903, 912, 378 N.E.2d 459, 465 (1978)
(holding that court has power to set aside judgment for fraud or duress); cf Dominick v.
Dominick, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 85, 89, 463 N.E.2d 564, 568 1984) (affirming a denial to
re-open case on alleged valuation error); Kirtz v. Kirtz, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 141, 144, 421
N.E.2d 1270, 1272 (1981) (declining to vacate division absent a showing of fraud). But
see Grubert v. Grubert, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 811, 817-19, 483 N.E.2d 100, 104 (1985)
(overruling judicial discretion in modification order). In Grubert, the Appeals Court
revesed the trial court's economic orders on "equitable" grounds because it left a wife with
little disposable income and a lower standard of living. Grubert 20 Mass. App. Ct. at
817-19,483 N.E.2d at 104; see also Brash v. Brash, 407 Mass. 101, 106, 551 N.E.2d 523,
526 (1990) (affirming trial court's modification of an absolute decree and property division
after a 10-year hiatus). In Brash, the wife did answer or appear at the original proceedings.
Brash, 407 Mass at 102, 551 N.E.2d at 524. Ten years after the final judgment, she sought
modification and property division. Id. The trial court rejected the defense of laches and
deemed the couple's oral agreement void for unconscionability. Brash, 407 Mass. at 105,
551 N.E.2d at 525.
2 See Rolde, 12 Mass. App. Ct. at 400, 425 N.E.2d at 389 (holding discretion not
abused by set-off); Inker & Kindregan, supra note 4, at 38 (discussing the broad parameters
ofjudge's discretion); cf Brash, 407 Mass. at 105, 551 N.E.2d at 525 (holding that judge
has broad discretion in setting and awarding attorney's fees).

" See Rice v. Rice, 372 Mass. 398, 401, 361 N.E.2d 1305, 1306 (1977) (findings
of fact for Massachusetts General Laws chapter 208, § 34 cases); Bianco v. Bianco, 371
Mass. 420, 422, 358 N.E.2d 243, 244 (1976) (outlining Massachusetts General Laws
chapter 208, § 34 requirement); Baheeli v. Bahceli, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 449, 449, 409
N.E.2d 207, 207 (1980) (noting the propriety of making statutorily required findings even
absent a request for division).
" Dominick v. Dominick, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 85, 89-90, 463 N.E.2d 564, 568 (1984);
Robbins v. Robbins, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 576, 578, 453 N.E.2d 1058, 1060 (1983).
3 See Kirtz, 12 Mass. App. Ct. at 144, 421 N.E.2d at 1272; Rolde, 12 Mass. App.
Ct. at 402,425 N.E.2d at 390; (discussing the use of separate analyses for property division
and alimony).
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awarded remotely, sometimes well after the original judgment.32 Only where the
petitioner is seeking to modify an existing support award, or reinstate an
expiring one, does the petitioner need to demonstrate a material and substantial
change in circumstances.33 Finally, when a court hears a petition to award or
modify support, it may consider the assets of obligor spouses in addition to their
future earning potential.34 The equitable distribution statute is also interpreted
broadly, and the courts have held that nearly any conceivable property right is
subject to division.3

32 See Davidson v. Davidson, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 364, 367, 474 N.E.2d 1137, 1142

(1985) (holding probate court that has not specifically ruled out support to recipient spouse
may later award it); Maze v. Mihalovich, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 323, 325, 387 N.E.2d 196, 197
(1979) (holding property division or support claims not raised in pleadings or included in
ruling are not res judicata and may be tried later). Moreover, if the petition is for initial

support, there is no requirement that the petitioner demonstrate a "material change in
circumstances." Cherrington v. Cherrington, 404 Mass 267, 271, 534 N.E.2d 1159, 1162
(1989). Massachusetts General Laws chapter 208, § 37 (1975) states in pertinent part,

"[a]fter a judgment... a court may... revise and alter its judgment relative to the amount
of such alimony or annual allowance and the payment thereof, and may make any judgment
relative thereto that it mighthave made in the originalaction." (emphasis added). Where
change of circumstances is not an element in an original complaint for alimony, it is not
required for an initial award. Cherrington, 404 Mass at 271, 534 N.E.2d at 1162.
33 Davidson, 19 Mass. App. Ct. at 366-67, 474 N.E.2d at 1141; see also Harris v.
Harris, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 931, 932, 500 N.E.2d 1359, 1360 (1986) (finding inheritance
of $165,000 as a material change permitting alimony termination). Change in circumstances

is viewed liberally and can even extend to claims based solely on an obligor's increase in
wealth. Bak v. Bak, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 608, 622, 511 N.E.2d 625, 634 (1987) (finding
material change based on appreciation of West German Mark). But see Binder v. Binder,
7 Mass. App. Ct. 751, 756, 390 N.E.2d 260, 263 (1979) (denied downward modification
to surgeon who contracted osteoarthritis in hands). Where, however, an agreement survives
the divorce, the court applies the threshold standard of "countervailing equities" in allowing
modification. Knox v. Remick, 371 Mass. 433, 437, 358 N.E.2d 432, 436 (1976). The
courts will also allow modification contrary to an agreement where the recipient would
become a ward of the state. Id. Consequently, even a prior surviving agreement between
the parties does not prevent modification. See Ryan v. Ryan, 371 Mass. 430, 432, 358
N.E.2d 431, 432 (1976) (discussing court's retention of jurisdiction over support
irrespective of party's agreement).
' See, e.g., Schuler v. Schuler, 382 Mass. 366, 369, 416 N.E.2d 197, 200 (1981)
(including proceeds of previously divided stock holdings); Krokyn v. Krokyn, 378 Mass.
206,210, 390 N.E.2d 733, 736 (1979) (including tenancy by the entirety interest held with
second wife); Davidson, 19 Mass. App. Ct. at 369, 474 N.E.2d at 1142 (including
beneficial interest in trust).
3s See DavOn, 19 Mass. App. Ct. at 369, 474 N.E.2d at 1143 (citing Rice v. Rice,
372 Mass. 398,401,361 N.E.2d 1305, 1306 (1977); Frederick v. Frederick, 29 Mass. App.
Ct. 329, 334, 560 N.E.2d 151, 154 (1990) (affirming finding that wife can let or refinance
home in order to become self-sufficient).
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Massachusetts broadened the scope of the available marital estate, holding
that all assets of the obligor spouse are considered in modifying support
orders.' In Krokyn v. Kroky, 7 the Supreme Judicial Court interpreted this
section to include previously exempt assets.3" The property at issue in Krokyn

had not been part of the marital estate, thus could not have been considered in
any property division.39 Krokyn is significant because the Supreme Judicial
Court, citing authority from Massachusetts and other jurisdictions, held that
exempt property, which could not be reached by the former spouse, was to be
included in the ability to pay analysis irrespective of its source, the nature of the
obligor's interest, or the liquidity of the asset.' As long as the obligor spouse
derived any benefit from the property, it was includable in the analysis, even if
it was inalienable by either party.4 '
Three years later, in Schuler v. Schuler,42 the Supreme Judicial Court relied
on Krokyn in disallowing a modification petition brought by an obligor spouse.4 3

See Rice, 372 Mass. at 401, 361 N.E.2d at 1305 (including premarital property and
gifts in modification decisions); Davidson, 19 Mass. App. Ct. at 369, 474 N.E.2d at 1137
(1985) (including interests in trust). But see Olski v. Olski, 197 Wis. 2d 237, 250, 540
N.W.2d 412, 417 (1995) (excluding assets from modification where that asset was
equitably divided at the divorce proceeding); Thiese v. Thiese, 169 Vt. 577, 579, 674 A.2d
789, 790-91 (1996) (noting other jurisdictions observe a res judicata approach to divided
assets). The "available interest" standard also applies to child support and is extended to
include the assets of a second wife in an ability to pay analysis. Silvia v. Silvia, 9 Mass.
App. Ct., 330, 340, 400 N.E.2d 1330, 1331-32 (1980).
37 378 Mass. 206, 390 N.E.2d 733 (1979).
38

Id. at 213, 390 N.E.2d at 737.

" Id. at 212, 390 N.E.2d at 735-36. The Krokyns divorced prior to the passage of
Massachusetts General Laws chapter 208, § 34 (1975). Id. Property not in existence at the
termination of the marriage cannot be subjected to property division. See Pare v. Pare, 409
Mass. 292, 297, 565 N.E.2d 1195, 1196-97 (1991) (allowing inclusion of post-separation
increase in value only). In Krokyn, the Supreme Judicial Court held that a husband's interest
in a marital home, held as tenants by the entirety with his present wife, was includable in
order to satisfy an alimony arrearage despite his inability to alienate the interest. Krokyn,
378 Mass. at 212, 390 N.E.2d at 735-36.
' See Krokyn, 378 Mass. at 213, 390 N.E.2d at 737 (citing Howard v. Howard, 130
So. 2d 83, 85-86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961)). In Howard, the Florida District Court of
Appeals allowed the lower court to consider the residence of the obligor husband and his
second wife, held as tenants by the entirety, as an includable asset for determining ability
to pay. Howard, 130 So. 2d at 86; cf Silvia, 9 Mass. App. Ct. at 340, 400 N.E.2d at 1332
(finding assets of second wife included in child support analysis).
4' Krokyn, 378 Mass. at 213-14, 390 N.E.2d at 737.
42 382 Mass. 366, 416 N.E.2d 197 (1981).
43 Schuler, 382 Mass. at 375, 416 N.E.2d at 204.
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The probate court had included the proceeds from the obligor husband's sale of
stock to the majority shareholder to determine that he had sufficient means to
continue paying alimony, notwithstanding an involuntary job loss." The
couple's separation agreement included an executed provision for the
distribution of any proceeds fiom the subsequent sale of this stock.45 In holding
that the remaining proceeds were subject to inclusion in the husband's ability to
pay analysis, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed a subsequent reallocation of
the assets originally distributed by the separation agreement. 4
The Massachusetts Appeals Court eventually ruled on a direct challenge to
the redistributive effect of a modification order in Hartog v. Hartog.4' Here, the

court awarded the use of the marital home to the wife for two years, after which
the parties were to sell the home and divide the proceeds. 4 Before the two year
period expired, the wife petitioned to extend it for an additional eight years, and
the probate court granted the petition.49 The husband appealed the order as an
impermissible modification of a court order which affected his interest in the
property." In upholding the trial court, the Appeals Court held that the
occupancy period was in the nature of child support, and therefore could be
modified.5" The effect of this reclassification was two fold. First, it converted
the time-value of this interest into child support, and second, it subjected the
holders to risk of loss due to market fluctuations.5 2 The second risk is borne
equally by the parties, however, losing the potential use value of the proceeds for
eight years still works a substantial hardship upon the obligor spouse because
of the delay in receipt and a diminution in the value of the obligor's equitably
divided share.

44Id.

4' Schuler, 382 Mass. at 369, 416 N.E.2d at 200. The separation agreement called
for a distribution to the wife often percent of the net sale proceeds, which were paid over

prior to this action. Id.
"

Schuler, 382 Mass. at 369, 416 N.E.2d at 200.

47 27 Mass. App. Ct. 124, 125, 535 N.E.2d 239, 240 (1989).
48

Id. at 125, 535 N.E.2d at 240.

49 Id.
5* Id.
Under the terms of the division, as modified by the support order, the wife
would receive a larger percentage of the sale proceeds in the event of a market decline from
1986 to 1996. Id. at 128, 535 N.E.2d at 242.

s' Id. at 128-29, 535 N.E.2d at 242.
s, See Hartog v. Hartog, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 124, 128, 535 N.E.2d 239, 242 (1989)

(stating the fact that "the order affects the economic value of the husband's distribution is
not determinative").
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III. HEiNs V. LEDIS
Heins v. Ledis involved a challenge to a property division and alimony

awarded to the respondent-wife. 53 The only significant marital property was the
marital home, which also housed the couples's veterinary practice.5 4 The trial
judge ordered the marital home conveyed to the husband, while requiring him to
pay the wife $17,500 and assume the outstanding mortgage.15 The order also

required him to give his wife an interest-bearing note for $15,000, payable in
three years, as a division of the veterinary practice.'8 Finally, the judge ordered
alimony in the amount of $300 per week .for a period of six years to reimburse
the wife for sums she had invested in the property. 57 The husband appealed both

the alimony award and property division, and the Supreme Judicial Court
granted direct appellate review.5 On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated
the alimony provision, finding the award unsupported by the evidence and an
abuse of discretion by the trial judge.59 In doing so, the court held that
reimbursement for financial contributions is not a proper basis for awarding

alimony. c
IV. ANALYSIS
The holding in Heins prevents judges from using reimbursement as a

422 Mass. 477, 479, 664 N.E.2d 10, 13 (1996).
-"Heis, 422 Mass. at 479, 664 N.E.2d at 13. The trial court found that the husband,
a veterinaian, ran the clinic while the wife made substantial investments in the house and
equipmnt and also helped in its administration. Id. The award of attorney fees to the wife
is not at issue. Id.
55 Heins, 422 Mass. at 479-80, 664 N.E.2d at 13.
56 Id.
5

Id. at 479-80,664 N.E.2d at 13. The total alimony award, if both parties survived
for six years, would amount to $93,600, exclusive of property division. Id. The wife paid
approximately $85,000 toward the house in a down payment and contributed time and
money to the veterinary business. Id. The husband contributed approximately $22,000 to
the purchase and renovation of the property. Heins 422 Mass. at 479-80, 664 N.E.2d at 13.
- Id. at 478, 664 N.E.2d at 12.
59 Id. at 478, 664 N.E.2d at 12. The court invalidated provisions of the property
division in addition to the alimony provision and remanded the case. Id. at 486, 664 N.E.2d
at 18.
60 Heins v. Ledis, 422 Mass. 477, 486, 664 N.E.2d 10, 18 (1996).
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rationale for awarding alimony.6' The court noted that the property subject to
division is limited to marital property in existence at the time of trial.6 2 As
previously noted, however, the property that may be considered in awarding

support is all of the property owned by, or potentially available to, the paying
spouse.' While the Heins decision would seemingly reign in a probate judge's
discretion, it does not prevent a court from first dividing the marital property and

then factoring the property back into its consideration for a modification award.'
Heins only relates to the stated reasons for awarding alimony, not the nature of
what may be awarded.t Indeed, the "ledger approach" to asset allocation takes
all property available to the obligor spouse into account, even if this property
cannot be reached by the parties.' Reimbursement may still be employed as a

Id. at 486. Heins changes existing doctrine inasmuch as reimbursement alimony
should only be employed where there is no property to equitably divide. See id. at 483, 664
N.E.2d at 13 (limiting holding to reimbursement rationale employed by trial judge).
62 Id. at 483, 664 N.E.2d at 13.
See, e.g., Krokyn v. Krokyn, 378 Mass. 206, 210, 390 N.E.2d 733, 736 (1979)
(including tenancy by the entirety interest held with second wife); Rice v. Rice, 372 Mass.
398, 401, 361 N.E.2d 1305, 1308 (1977) (including premarital property and gifts);
Davidson v. Davidson, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 364, 369, 474 N.E.2d 1137, 1142 (including
interest in trusts).
" See Heins, 422 Mass. at 484, 664 N.E.2d at 14 (holding probate court erred by
excluding payee's property in statutory factor analysis).
Sld.

See, e.g., Krokyn, 382 Mass. at 213-14, 390 N.E.2d at 737 (permitting
consideration of husband's interest in home held as tenants by the entirety with second
wife); Silvia v. Silvia, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 330, 340, 400 N.E.2d 1330, 1332 (1980)
(approving consideration of second wife's assets for modification); Davidson, 19 Mass.
App. Ct. at 369,474 N.E.2d at 1143 (allowing consideration of trust interests). One of the
major rationales for property division is that it seeks to end dealings between the parties and
to make each spouse as self-sufficient as possible. Lee R. Russ, Annotation, DIVORCE EQUITABLE DISTRIBUrION, 41 A.L.R. 4th 481 (1985). Because many assets do not lend
themselves readily to division, the courts may use a "set-off' approach awarding whole
assets to one party in consideration of other illiquid or liquid assets, or a combination of
both. Rolde v. Rolde, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 398, 400, 425 N.E.2d 388, 389 (1981). The
primary criticism of this approach is that assets of different characters behave differently and
subject the parties to different risks. Hanify v. Hanify, 403 Mass. 184, 191, 526 N.E.2d
1056, 1062 (1968) (Liacos, J., concurring). Justice Liacos stated in dictum that "a final and
equitable property division under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 208, section 34
should not be based on speculative assets." Id. This inequality in character, allocating a
unique risk to only one party, forms one of the bases for the tension between property
division and support where the property depreciates significantly, be it a business, pension,
or residence, the risk is not equally allocated. Id.; cf Dewan v. Dewan, 17 Mass. App. Ct.
97, 99, 455 N.E.2d 1236, 1239 (1983) (promulgating rules designed to mitigate risk in
dividing pensions).
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grounds for effecting a property division, thus the only limitation on
reimbursement is the valuation of the husband's total estate at the
commencement of the action.67 Consequently, the court's holding regarding
alimony merely directs the probate court to take a different road to the same

destination, disregarding the important valuation question presented in the
appeal.6
The Heins court chose to forego answering the appellant's contention that
the valuation and redistributive effect of the trial court's decision improperly
awarded the wife a sum in excess of the marital property's value.69 As
previously stated, there is no barrier or defense to re-distribution in the
modification proceeding.70 While the facts in Heins do not address this
possibility, the reimbursement question along with the overlooked valuation
question could arise when the movant who requests modification bases the need
on the loss of part or all of the previously divided property. 7
Generally, a spouse is barred from seeking modification where the changes

67Heins, 422 Mass. at 484, 664 N.E.2d at 16. (citing Handrahan v. Handrahan, 28
Mass. App. Ct. 167, 170, 547 N.E.2d 1141, 1143 (1989)). Citing mootness, the Heins
court declined to address the issue of making an award which would provide the wife with
more money than she invested in the marital property despite a decline in its value. Heins,
422 Mass. at 487, 664 N.E.2d at 18. Here, the total value of the awards made to the wife
totaled in excess of $126,000 while the court found her initial contribution was $85,000.
Id. at 478-79, 664 N.E.2d at 13. The net effect of the "reimbursement" alimony allocates
all of the unrealized loss to the husband while awarding the wife an artificial $41,000
profit, exclusive of any prior mortgage payments. Id.
a See Heins, 422 Mass. at 485-86, 664 N.E.2d at 17 (holding the appeal regarding
valuation moot).
- See Heins, 422 Mass. at 488,664 N.E.2d at 21 (pointing to apparent award to wife
in excess of marital estate). By its own operation, a property division cannot award a value
greater than the marital estate at the time of dissolution. See Pare v. Pare, 409 Mass. 292,
297, 565 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (1991) (including increase in value during pendency of
action); cf Savides v. Savides, 400 Mass. 250, 252, 508 N.E.2d 617, 618 (1987) (holding
adjustments to valuation at time of divorce permissible).
70 See Kirtz v. Kirtz, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 141, 144, 421 N.E.2d 1270, 1272 (1981)
(denying reconsideration of property division following allegations that husband
understated asset values); Maze v. Mihalovich, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 323, 325, 387 N.E.2d 196,
198 (1979) (holding property division could be awarded where not previously adjudicated).
"' See Churbuck v. Churbuck, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 464, 401 N.E.2d 893, 894 (1980)
(allowing modification based on bank foreclosure on former marital home). In Churbuck,
the mortgagee of the marital home, previously awarded to the wife, exercised an
acceleration clause and foreclosed on the home. Id. The Appeals Court found that this was

a material change in circumstances which warranted an award modification in the wife's
favor. Id.
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in circumstances are characterized as voluntary.72 Courts have consistently
recognized willful dissipation as a consideration in making divisions and
alimony awards, in effect treating the spendthrift spouse as though they still
possessed the value of the assets." When, however, a spouse seeks relief from
financial difficulty as a result of negligent conduct or a simple failure to insure
against loss, there are no clear standards. Irrespective of how equitably divided
assets are lost, alimony modification implicitly gives a negligent party the right
of contribution from an ex-spouse simply by stating the necessary grounds for
modification.74 For example, a spouse in possession of a divided asset can
routinely seek modification against their ex-spouse for a casualty loss
irrespective of fault." This reflects the evolving willingness of the courts to
76
stretch the bounds of modification to include routine and foreseeable expenses.
As previously stated, there is no barrier to prevent a court from ordering
additional alimony as a result of changed circumstances, irrespective of the
reason for them." The result is indistinguishable from an order that reconsiders
the original property division and recalculates the formula, a recalculation that

72

See Tydings v. Tydings, 349 A2d 462, 462 (D.C. 1975) (denying modification for

reduction in income where spouse retires or resigns). But see Dennis v. Dennis, 29 Mass.
App. Ct. 161, 165, 558 N.E.2d 991, 993 (1990) (reversing modification denied by trial
court where wife spent sums on vacations, home improvements, and outstanding personal

loans).
See Pagar v. Pagar, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 3, 397 N.E.2d 1293, 1295 (1980)
(disallowing support where misuse of assets found); cf Harris v. Harris, 23 Mass. App. Ct.
931, 933, 500 N.E.2d 1359, 1361 (1986) (declining to reinstate alimony where wife had
deliberately foregone income production). But see Dennis, 29 Mass. App. Ct. at 165, 558
N.E.2d at 993 (allowing modification despite nonessential dissipation of assets).
7' Dennis,29 Mass. App. Ct. at 165, 558 N.E.2d at 993; Churbuck, 9 Mass. App. Ct.
at 464, 401 N.E.2d at 893.
' See Furrv. Fur, 413 S.E.2d 72, 73 (Va. Ct. App. 1992) (reversing modification
denial and trial court's finding that movant could have foreseen change in circumstances);
compare Pagar v. Pagar, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 3, 397 N.E.2d 1293, 1295 (1980) (disallowing
support where misuse of assets found) with Dennis, 29 Mass. App. Ct. at 165, 558 N.E.2d
at 993 (allowing modification despite asset dissipation).
76 Furr,413 S.E.2d at 74-75. The Furr court overturned a lower court decision that
denied modification to a petitioner where the petitioner could have foreseen the need for
automobile expenses. Id.
7 See, e.g., Schuler v. Schuler, 382 Mass. 366, 370, 416 N.E.2d 197, 199; Krokyn
v. Krokyn, 378 Mass. 206, 210, 390 N.E.2d 733, 737; Kirtz v. Kirtz,, 12 Mass. App. Ct.
141, 146, 421 N.E.2d 1270, 1273 (1981). The "public charge" test may be employed to
indemnify a recipient spouse for dissipating their marital estate. See Knox v. Remick, 371
Mass. 433,437,358 N.E.2d 432, 436 (1976) (holding judge may invalidate an agreement
in order to prevent a spouse from becoming a public charge).
13
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is prohibited on its face, but allowable under alimony modification."' Thus, the
courts may interpret Heins as supporting the proposition that the label attached
to the order should conform to the statutory criteria irrespective of the
redistributive effect it has on previously divided property.
Additionally, subsequent support orders or alimony modifications can still

be predicated on reimbursement because the Heins opinion only applies to initial

support orders. 9 The development of equitable distribution in Massachusetts
suggests that Heins will not bar retroactive reimbursement through an alimony
order because the Supreme Judicial Court narrowly construes decisions bearing
on obligors' rights."' While the court discussed the prospect of an obligor's
dwindling estate, overall the court has consistently expanded the base of
property interests subject to the statute.8 '
Additionally, Heins and its companion cases may have the unintended
effect of reviving attempts to discharge obligations in bankruptcy. The court's
opinion states that probate judges should not "blur the distinction between
alimony and property division."8' Where the obligation is a property division,
both in name and substance, it may be discharged in bankruptcy proceedings.8 3

" See Belsky v. Belsky, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 852, 853, 400 N.E.2d 878, 880 (1980)
(holding future change in pension values a material change in circumstances); Hay v.
Cloutier, 389 Mass. 248, 252-53, 449 N.E.2d 361, 364 (1983) (allowing alimony where
property division opportunity had lapsed).
" Cf Hartog v. Hartog, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 124, 128, 535 N.E.2d 239, 242 (1989)
(holding occupation of home distinguishable as support rather than divided interest).
so See Hanify v. Hanify, 403 Mass. 184, 187, 526 N.E.2d 1056, 1059 (holding
ripened damages in tort actions included); Belsky, 9 Mass. App. Ct. at 853, 400 N.E.2d at
880 (holding interest in future inheritance included).
" Compare Heins v. Ledis, 422 Mass. 477, 486, 664 N.E.2d 10, 17-18 (1996)
(refusing to address valuation issue) with Schuler, 382 Mass. at 375, 416 N.E.2d at 204
(finding husband not impoverished) and Davidson v. Davidson, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 364,
366,477 N.E.2d 1137, 1141-42 (1985) (noting prior interpretations of law to limit defenses
by obligor spouses).
Heins, 422 Mass. at 480, 664 N.E.2d at 13 (citing Inker, supra note 2, at 11).
S11 U.S.C. § 523(aX5). The statute states, in pertinent part, "A discharge... does
not discharge an individual debtor for any debt.., to a spouse, former spouse or child of
the debtor for alimony to, maintenancefor or support of such spouse or child" (emphasis

added). Id.
State courts cannot alter discharges because of constitutional limitations and the
automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., Abram v. Burg, 367 Mass.
617, 327 N.E.2d 745, 746-47 (1975) (holding unsatisfied obligations dischargeable if not
for support or maintenance); LaFleur v. LaFleur, 11 B.R. 26, 28 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981)
(holding discharging debt owed to former mother-in-law as support law only covered former
spouses); Plotski v. Tunny, 44 B.P 911, 913-14 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1984) (construing second
mortgage to be support and thus non-dischargeable).
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The obligee spouse must return to the probate court and petition for initial or
modified support in order to replace discharged debts."4 The dicta in Hems
could be employed to challenge support orders which are thinly veiled
reimpositions of discharged debts where there is no required showing of changed

circumstances.8 5 This argument is without force, however, as the courts will
likely limit Heins to prevent this result.
In other jurisdictions, divorce courts have reimposed the debts discharged

in bankruptcy as non-dischargeable alimony. 6 Massachusetts has not ruled
directly on this issue, however as an issue of first impression, the Supreme
Judicial Court will likely limit Heins and follow these other jurisdictions by
allowing modification actions after a successful bankruptcy discharge.87

Often, debts imposed by trial courts are installment debts between spouses with the
obligee comparable to an unsecured creditor. See Plotski, 44 B.R. at 911. Some state
courts will reclassify the debts as alimony. See Siragusa v. Siragusa, 108 Nev. 987, 995,
843 P.2d 807, 812 (1992) (upholding a lower court finding that a master could properly
consider the discharge of a property division liability in modifying alimony). The Siragusa
court rejected the premise that state courts were reimposing the same debts that the federal
court had discharged in bankruptcy, focusing instead on the improved financial position of
the discharged debtor husband. See Siragusa, 108 Nev. at 996, 843 P.2d at 813 (finding
alimony modification was new debt imposed by the state in their capacity to regulate marital
relations).
The rationale for modification is predicated on the improved finances of the
discharged debtor. Siragusa, 108 Nev. at 995, 843 P.2d at 812. It should be noted,
however, that the discharged debts were often payable to, or on behalf of, the ex-spouse,
thus creating a corresponding "change in circumstances." Cf Welford v. Nobrega, 30
Mass. App. Ct. 92, 100-01, 565 N.E.2d 1239, 1244 (1991) (refusing to extend this
rationale to lottery winnings held jointly with another).
' Albin v. Albin, 591 F.2d 94, 96-7 (9th Cir. 1979); Plotski, 44 B.R. at 913-14. See
generally Singer, supra, note 4, at 93-97. Increasingly, the bankruptcy courts look past
orders to the nature of the obligation and refuse tQ discharge orders in the nature of support.
See Darrel Olidge, Divorce Liens under Section 52209 of the FederalBankruptcy Code:
Resolving Tensions between Family and Bankruptcy Law, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 879, 885
(Oct. 1992) (discussing judicial interpretation of equitable distribution orders in bankruptcy
proceedings); accordSinewitz v. Sinewitz, 166 B.R. 786, 788 (D. Mass. 1994).
35 Heins, 422 Mass. at 484, 664 N.E.2d at 16.
86 See Plotski, 44 B.R. at 913-14; Siragusa, 108 Nev. at 995, 843 P.2d at 812
(analyzing the reimposition of property divisions via alimony after discharge).
' Compare Churbuck,9 Mass. App. Ct. at 468, 401 N.E.2d at 894 with Siragusa,
108 Nev. at 996, 843 P.2d at 813 (distinguishing discharged debt and new obligation); cf.
Brash,407 Mass. at 107, 551 N.E.2d at 527 (refusing to apply the automatic stay provision
of Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 62(d) to attorney's fees awarded to wife). Note that the 1994
revisions to the Bankruptcy Code did include property divisions as non-dischargeable debts
under certain conditions. 11 U.S.C. § 523(aX(5).
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V. CONCLUSION

The concept of finality in dissolution cases is a legal fiction that cannot be
maintained in light of the conflicting equitable considerations employed by the
courts interpreting the Massachusetts equitable distribution statute. Judges use
wide discretion to make redistributive awards that are unassailable when the
accepted statutory findings have been made.
The Hems decision,
notwithstanding its apparent departure from precedent, does nothing to impede
redistribution of divided assets. It is, at best, a "speed bump" for probate judges
looking to redistribute a wealthier spouse's estate.
Looking forward, economic uncertainties will make the flexibility and tax
benefit of alimony payments attractive to payor spouses. These payor spouses
will not want to be locked into an onerous property settlement only to see their
share firther eroded by subsequent modification orders. Previously, the payor's
only defense to repeated redistributions was bankruptcy, however, the 1994
revisions to the Bankruptcy Code and the aggressive expansion of the "changed
circumstances" doctrine have foreclosed this avenue. These spouses may instead
elect to make larger alimony payments and preserve the modification option for
themselves in the event of financial difficulties.88 While the courts consistently
find reasons to avoid downward modifications, they will inevitably become
bound by their own precedents and will have to make them in some cases or risk
a charge of gender bias. Consequently, property division has gone from a
concept that promised to liberate the parties from each other to one that makes
continued economic ties more attractive and litigation more prevalent. In this
sense the Massachusetts equitable distribution statute cannot meet its primary
objective unless the courts return some stability to the post-marital ownership
picture. While the Heins court successfully established a minor boundary in
alimony jurisprudence, it also drew the map that future judges and litigants will
use to circumvent it.
Michael J. DelTergo

" Cf. Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 903, 905, 595 N.E.2d 792, 794
(1992) (noting tax benefits and flexibility as rationales for awarding alimony).

